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The Church of EnglandBy Peter Hitchens
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This had dire consequences because "a world without God meant no punishment for sin, and therefore no sin ..." The church tried very hard to stay "relevant" but if no one believed in God or souls or sin, "how was it to become ’relevant’ to the new age without becoming completely irrelevant to its purpose of saving souls?"
As in virtually every institution, the rot started at the top, and "the Church, like the railways or the government, was more and more being run for the benefit of its own employees rather than for the mere churchgoers or the nation itself." As a result, congregations that were perfectly content, had all manner of noisome changes foisted on them.
Rather than slow the defection of worshipers, "modernization" has hastened
it, but this has not slowed the pace of destructive innovation. As Mr. Hitchens
explains, the church once understood it must be conservative:
"Thomas Cranmer [author of the 1662 Book of Prayer that was until recently in common
use] and the great translators consciously built their books to last, just as the architects of church buildings had
done, and continued to do. They believed that some ideas lay outside normal time and could therefore be expressed in a way that defied passing
fashion. This belief survived until the late 20th century," when it was done to death with trendy new
liturgy, music, doctrine, prayers, and church decorations.
Mr. Hitchens explains why the old, majestic liturgy had to go: "The glories of the language were offensive to the modernizers because they reminded them of what they owed to the past, because they reinforced the bonds of
tradition, but above all because they constantly reminded them of a view of religion which was not
theirs. It did not offer salvation through the Overseas Development Agency, the Anti-Apartheid
Movement, Amnesty International and the Social Security budget. It offered it in an entirely non-political
way, through the faith and deeds of the individual." Mr. Hitchens points out that the old confessions vividly evoked the wretchedness of man caught in the toils of sin whereas the new versions "sound like the apologies offered by railway companies for late
trains."
Mr. Hitchens explains that "a man’s moral worth is now measured by the level of taxation he is willing to support, rather than by his faith or even his good
works. Other tests - opposition to apartheid or General Pinochet - are valued more highly than personal adherence to the
Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount."
As the church subsides into irrelevance, "many young children entirely deprived of a tradition passed on without thinking by twenty previous generations have no idea at all of what goes on in churches . . . ."
Mr. Hitchens notes that nowhere has there been greater change than in British attitudes towards
sex, which were always much more conservative than those on the continent. Now, there are no social sanctions against
fornication, which has brought with it soaring rates of divorce, illegitimacy,
abortion, and disease. "Now the entire country seemed to be obsessed," Mr. Hitchens
writes, "with staring at naked female chests, swearing and making dirty
jokes. Like the pagans of old, unaffected by climate, the British were now dancing round a giant
phallus. Unlike the pagans theirs was a sterile phallus, disarmed by condoms and
pills - the first heathen sexual cult to be based around sterility rather than
fertility."
Mr. Hitchens notes that the sex revolution has changed our vocabularies, not least by dignifying youthful copulation as
"sexual experimentation:" "What, by the way, are these ’experiments’ and the other
’experiments’ in drug-taking seeking to prove or disprove, which is not already
known? It is interesting that this word is so frequently used for wrong actions taken by the
young." Likewise, the disappearance of social sanction means we no longer talk about
"unmarried mothers" or "broken homes," but instead of
"one-parent families," as if they were just as good as the other kind.
Wittingly or not, government promoted bastardy by lathering promiscuous mothers with uplift and benefits that remove the penalties for reckless
procreation. Of course, the helpless "one-parent family" is the perfect client of the state. Completely dependent on the Social Security budget, its members have dismantled the last bulwark against
serfdom. As Mr. Hitchens reminds us: "The greatest fortress of human liberty, proof against all earthly
powers, is the family. . . . All serious tyrannies have sought to undermine or infiltrate
it, socialist tyrannies most of all."
Mr. Hitchens concedes that the lot of the "fallen woman" was a harsh
one, but accepting illegitimacy only made it more common, and condemned millions of children to the impersonal cruelty of
fatherlessness: "Shame and stigma, which once both defended respectable marriage and heaped misery on the poor bastard and his wretched
mother, have disappeared. Instead, there is the slower, vaguer, more indirect misery of a society where fewer and fewer children have two
parents, and where more and more women are married to the State."
Even the left is now groping towards a realization that there is such a thing as
depravity, and that a hereditary class of welfare recipients is not a blessing.
However: "If you do not believe in sin, then you can hardly be expected to use up much energy fighting against it. And if you do believe in sin, then you are
’judgemental,’ and automatically excluded from the debate."
Interestingly, Mr. Hitchens calls all this "the Americanization of our sex lives," claiming that
"[Elvis] Presley dug beneath the fortifications of British sexual reserve, leaving them so weakened that John Lennon and Mick Jagger could knock them down
completely."
The destruction of the family was yet another cause and consequence of monolithic
liberalism: "[The family’s] defeat during the last five decades has helped to produce the most conformist and least individualist generation in known
history. Without a strong family, the growing child is much more easily influenced by his own age
group, themselves under pressure from TV programmers, advertisers, teachers and
fashion."
A nation that now approves of sport sex of all kinds can hardly disapprove of
homosexuals, whom Britons dare not criticize but must "sentimentalize . . . as modern
heroes." Mr. Hitchens notes an asymmetry: "Smoking and buggery can both kill
you," he observes, but smokers are foolish people who take dangerous risks while homosexuals are victims and
martyrs. No one officially recommends "safer" smoking-low tar and nicotine. Complete renunciation is the only option for
smokers, but "there is not even a hint of disapproval of anal sex or illegal drugs in official or semi-official propaganda about AIDS."
Much of what Mr. Hitchens opposes is the miasma of modernism common to all Western
countries, but he has specifically British concerns. He thinks a small island is not a good place for automobiles, and that by supplanting an extensive train system cars have destroyed much of the
countryside. He regrets the disappearance of regional accents. He is sorry that
"specifically local or specifically British styles of architecture have given way to the international blandness of concrete and
glass." He also mourns the loss of British weights and measures and of the old currency system of shillings,
florins, and crowns: "[I]t is an odd truth that this sort of measure, highly practical and tested as it is, rarely survives any sort of
revolution. It requires deference and tradition to survive. Without it, the toe-counting simplicity of decimal and metric systems is all that is
left."
Now, of course, Britain is debating whether to join the European Monetary System and thereby lose not only the pound sterling but economic
independence. For Mr. Hitchens, a false step means no return: "If we are what we used to
be, then this is a last unrepeatable moment at which we can halt our extinction as a culture and a
nation."
What Mr. Hitchens is describing is nothing short of tragedy. Like all men of the West, the British are a denatured
people, so weakened and bewildered they are unable to resist even what would be genuine
abolition: displacement by aliens. What makes it tragedy is that the British have done this to
themselves. Mr. Hitchens recalls that to Evelyn Waugh, having Labour in power in 1945 was
"similar to living under foreign occupation." As for the current state of
decline:
"A real occupation would almost certainly have produced a resistance, the circulation of banned texts and the holding of secret religious services. But a county which ploughs under its own culture, without violence or open
suppression, has no such resistance. The objects of the attack are unaware that they are under
attack, and there are no martyrs, no persecution to bring resistance into
being."
The revolution has been non-violent-so far: "I cannot guarantee that it will not lead to bloodshed in the end, as revolutionary ideas so often do, but it has been restrained up till
now. For this has been a very British revolution, perhaps the last thing we shall do that is
British."
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